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CRmnNALPROCEDURE 
PARRETTI v. UNITED STATES 
143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Parretti v. United States, l the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, addressed two con-
stitutional claims: (1) whether Giancarlo Parretti's arrest pur-
suant to an Extradition Treaty with France violated the Fourth 
Amendment;2 and (2) whether his detention without bail prior 
to the French government's request for his extradition violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 3 
The en bane court refused to address these issues, however, 
claiming that since Parretti fled the United States while his 
appeal was pending, he was a fugitive from justice.· The en 
bane court therefore dismissed his appeal under the fugitive 
disentitlement doctrine. 5 
1. 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 179 (1998). The 
appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was argued and 
submitted on December 18, 1997 before the Ninth Circuit sitting en banco The decision 
was fIled on May 1, 1998. Judge Pregerson authored the opinion of the en banc court. 
Judge Reinhardt wrote the dissent. 
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("[Njo Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or afill'mation ... "). 
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
4. Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d at 508. 
5. See id. The fugitive disentitlement doctrine empowers the court to "dismiss the 
appeal of a defendant who flees the jurisdiction of the United States after timely ap-
pealing." See id. at 510. See also Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 242 
(1993) (Dismissal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine serves as an "appropriate 
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1990, Pathe Communications Corporation, headed by ap-
pellant, Giancarlo Parretti, an Italian citizen and resident, 
purchased MGM-United Artists. 6 This transaction gave rise to 
a number of lawsuits.7 On October 9, 1995, Parretti came to 
the United States in response to two of these lawsuits. 6 The 
following day, France sent a diplomatic note to the United 
States Department of State, requesting Parretti's "provisional 
arrest" pursuant to the U.S.-France Treaty of Extradition. 9 
An assistant United States Attorney, acting on behalf of the 
French government, filed a Complaint for Provisional Arrest 
Warrant. 10 No affidavits or other competent evidence were at-
tached in support of the complaint. 11 Nevertheless, a United 
States Magistrate Judge issued an arrest warrant based solely 
on the information contained within the complaint. 12 On Octo-
ber 18, 1995, federal agents arrested Parretti pursuant to a 
provisional arrest warrant at the Los Angeles law firm of 
White & Case. 13 
6. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d SOB, 509 (9th Cir. 199B). 
7. See m. 
B. See m. at 509·510. The state of Delaware obtained jurisdiction over Parretti in 
October 1995 in regard to perjury charges. He was also to be deposed in regard to 
another suit filed in Los Angeles Superior Court. See Parretti v. United States, 112 
F.3d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by Parretti v. United States 112 F.3d 75B 
(9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn by Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d SOB (9th Cir. 199B) 
(en bane). 
9. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 510. Article IV of the French Treaty provides: 
The arrest and detention of a fugitive may be applied for on information, even 
by telegraph, of the existence of a judgment of conviction or of a warrant of ar-
rest ... and that the person provisionally arrested may be held for up to 40 
days pending a possible request that the fugitive be extradited. 
22 U.S.T. 407, as amended, T.I.A.S. 7075. 
10. See Parretti, 122 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn by Parretti v. United 
States, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998) (en bane). See infra note 28. The complaint al-
leged that each of the charged offenses was an extraditable offense under the Treaty 
and that France had requested Parretti's "provisional arrest" under Article IV of the 
treaty. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 761. The French arrest warrant charged Parretti with 
misuse of company assets, forgery, embezzlement by false pretenses, and perjury. See 
m. 
11. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 761. 
12. See m. 
13. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
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Parretti was held without bail pending a request by the 
French government for his extradition. 14 During this time, 
Parretti filed an application to be released on bail and he filed 
a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California. 15 Both requests were de-
nied on November 9, 1995.16 
Parretti then filed a motion seeking emergency review. 17 On 
November 21, 1995, the Ninth Circuit granted Parretti's mo-
tion and ordered his release. 18 Eight days later, pursuant to 
France's request, the United States government filed a formal 
request with the Magistrate Judge for his extradition. 19 On 
May 10, 1996, the formal extradition hearing was held before 
the Magistrate Judge.20 Parretti was present at this hearing.21 
On May 31, 1996, Parretti was found extraditable on all 
charges alleged in the French ~rrest warrant.22 Subsequently, 
on July 1, 1996, Parretti flled a habeas petition, challenging 
the Magistrate Judge's finding of extraditability, in the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California. 23 
In October 1996, the Delaware superior court tried and con-
victed Parretti on criminal charges relating to a suit arising 
from the purchase of MGM studios. 24 Pending sentencing on 
these offenses, Parretti fled the Delaware court's jurisdiction in 
January of 1997.25 
14. See id. at 510. 
15. See id. In Parretti's habeas petition in the district court, he argued that the 
warrant for his provisional arrest was issued without probable cause in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 761-763. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit 
for emergency review, Parretti argued that his detention without bail violated the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause since he did not pose a risk of flight or danger to the 
community. See id. at 777. 
16. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
17. See id. 
18. See id. at 510. 
19. See id. at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
20. See Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1368 n.6. 
21. See id. 
22. See id. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 510, 512. 
3
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On March 12, 1997, the district court dismissed Parretti's 
habeas petition with prejudice pursuant to the fugitive disenti-
tlement doctrine. 26 
Thereafter, on May 6, 1997, the Ninth Circuit panel re-
leased a published opinion regarding its November 21, 1995 
order for Parretti's release.27 On October 2, 1997, the Ninth 
Circuit granted the United States government's request for re-
hearing en banc.28 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, dismissed the United 
States government's appeal pursuant to the fugitive disenti-
tlement doctrine (hereinafter "the doctrine").29 The majority 
explained that the doctrine empowered the court to "dismiss an 
appeal of a defendant who flees the jurisdiction of the United 
States after timely appealing. nao 
The court set out the four rationales underpinning the fugi-
tive disentitlement doctrine as applied to Parretti's appeal. 31 
First, the court reasoned that Parretti's fugitive status disen-
titled him from "calling upon the resources of the court to re-
26. See Parretti, 112 F.3d at 1368 n.6. 
27. See Parretti v. United States, 112 F.3d 1363 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by Par-
retti v. United States 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997). The amended opinion was subse-
quently withdrawn by Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508 (1998). In the amended 
opinion, the panel held in part that: (1) as a matter of first impression, sections of the 
extradition treaty with France which permitted "provisional arrest" without independ-
entjudicial determination of probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
clause; and (2) detention of a fugitive without bail violated due process, absent a 
showing that the fugitive posed flight risk. See Parretti, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997). 
Note that "where an order specifies that the opinion of the panel has been withdrawn, 
that opinion shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited in either briefs or 
oral argument to the Ninth Circuit or any district court in the Ninth Circuit." U.S. CT. 
OF ApP. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (5), 28 U.S.C.A. The Ninth Circuit issued the May 6, 1997 
opinion to explain its November 1995 order. See Parretti, 122 F.3d 758, 776 n.22. 
28. See Parretti, 143 F.3d. at 512 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
29. See Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1998). 
30. Id. 
31. See id. at 511. 
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solve his claims. "32 Therefore, Parretti forfeited his right to an 
appeal when he fled the jurisdiction of the United States.33 
Second, the court found that Parretti's fugitive status ren-
dered him. beyond the reach of the court's jurisdiction.3.f Thus, 
without jurisdiction, the court concluded that its judgment 
would not be enforceable.35 
Third, the court reasoned that invoking the fugitive disenti-
tlement doctrine served as a deterrent and promoted the integ-
rity of appellate practice.36 Lastly, the court stated that the 
adversary character of the criminal litigation could be compro-
mised because the fugitive's counsel may lose incentive to rep-
resent a fugitive client.37 
Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal pursuant to the 
fugitive disentitlement doctrine and withdrew the panel opin-
ion.36 
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION 
Judge Reinhardt, in dissent, argued that the fugitive disen-
titlement doctrine did not apply to Parretti's circumstances.39 
32. Id., citing Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970), which holds that: 
No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the 
merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review 
escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction. While 
such an escape does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or 
controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources 
of the Court for determination of his claims. 
Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366. 
33. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 511. 
34. See id., citing Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239-240 
(1993), for the proposition that it is within the court's discretion to refuse to hear a 
criminal case when the defendant fugitive cannot be made to respond to any ruling. 
35. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 511. 
36. See id. (citing Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 242, in tum citing Estelle v. Dor-
rough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975». 
37. See id. (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 724 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting». Judge Reinhardt, in dissent, noted that this rationale was not applicable 
in the instant case since Parretti's counsel agreed to continue his representation in 
spite of his client's fugitive status. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 513 (Reinhardt, J., dis-
senting). 
38. See Parretti, 122 F.3d 758 (1997). 
39. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 511-512. 
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He asserted that the court had the duty to reach the merits of 
the case.40 
The dissent noted that the purpose of the fugitive disenti-
tlement doctrine is to deny fugitives of the benefits and privi-
leges of the court's jurisdiction.'! The dissent reasoned that the 
majority's dismissal did not deny Parretti of any such benefits 
because Parretti did not seek relief from the court. 42 Instead, 
the dissent explained that the United States government 
sought relief on appeal from the precedential effect of the panel 
opinion.43 Therefore, the dissent argued that the fugitive dis-
entitlement doctrine did not apply.44 By dismissing the appeal, 
40. See id. Judge Reinhardt argued that two "extremely important issues" were 
before the court and should be carefully examined. These two constitutional were: (1) 
whether Parretti's arrest pursuant to an extradition treaty with France violated the 
Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether his detention without bail prior to France's re-
quest for his extradition violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See 
id., at 510. In regard to the applicability of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, the 
Ninth Circuit panel decision declined to dismiss the appeal under the doctrine noting 
that "Parretti is not seeking further relief from this court, and the relief we previously 
provided is of not further benefit to him." See Parretti, 122 F.3d at 766 n.22. This doc-
trine would only have been applicable had Parretti fled the United States prior to the 
Ninth Circuit's order for his release from custody. See id. 
41. See id. at 513. Disentitlement requires a "nexus" between a defendant's fugi-
tive status and the appellate proceedings. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 507 U.S. at 244. 
42. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 513. See also Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 
828 (1996) ("[tlhe sanction of disentitlement is most severe and 80 could disserve the 
dignitary purposes for which it is invoked. The dignity of a court derives from the 
respect accorded its judgments. That respect is eroded, not enhanced, by too free a 
recourse to rules foreclosing consideration of claims on the merits."). See also U.S. v. 
Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 
(1996}), holding that: "The Supreme Court has refused to allow application of disenti-
tlement when enforcement is possible despite the appellant's absence." Barnette, 129 
F.3d 1184. 
43. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 513. In cases where the fugitive disentitlement doc-
trine has been invoked, the relevant appellate proceeding had been invoked by the 
fugitive. See Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1879) (Supreme Court refused to hear 
a writ of error to review a criminal conviction, brought by the convicted party when the 
defendant had escaped from the court's jurisdiction); Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 
365 (1970) (Supreme Court held that where the defendant, who was free on bail, failed 
to surrender himself to state authorities, his appeal would be dismissed: "No persua-
sive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal 
case after the conlJicted defendant who has sought relJiew escapes from the restraints 
placed upon him pursuant to the conviction." (Emphasis added.)}. See also Empire 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, 111 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the defendants had forfeited their right to appeal the judgment against them under the 
fugitive disentitlement doctrine). In Parretti, the government petitioned for rehearing 
en bane, not Parretti, who was at that time a fugitive. 
44. See Parretti, 143 F.3d at 513. 
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the dissent concluded that the court was "frustrating its ability 
to resolve critical constitutional claims. "45 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION 
The constitutional issues before the Ninth Circuit en banc 
court remain unresolved, leaving a split in the circuit courts. 46 
In light of the compelling issues before the Ninth Circuit and 
the frequency with which these issues arise in extradition 
cases, some commentators reiterated the need for the Supreme 
Court to provide some guidance in this area. 47 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit broadened the applicability of 
the fugitive disentitlement doctrine to enable a court to dismiss 
an appeal even when the fugitive is not the party seeking re-
lief. 48 This extension of the doctrine thwarts its underlying 
45. Id. 
46. See United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553-54 (8th Cir. 1984) (upheld a 
warrant even though it was based on a complaint that alleged only that Wiebe was 
charged with an extraditable crime); Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir. 
1980) (interpreted the "further information" language of the extradition treaty between 
the U.S. and Italy as requiring a showing of probable cause); Sahagian v. United 
States, 864 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir 1988) (interpreted the "further information" lan-
guage in the extradition treaty with Spain as requiring a showing of probable cause for 
the issuance of a warrant for provisional arrest); In the Matter of Rovelli, 977 F.Supp. 
566 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding "no reason to elevate precedent from the criminal context, 
or from a lone Ninth Circuit extradition case, over the clear and long-standing extradi-
tion precedent of the United States Supreme Court and the Second Circuit"). The 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was 
denied on October 5, 1998, see Parretti v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 179. 
47. See Lis Wiehl, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend Toward Extend· 
ing Greater Constitutional Procedural Protections to Fugitives Fighting Extradition 
from the United States, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 729, 787 (1998) (noting that: "The Court 
has not addressed the bail issue in extradition since Wright v. Henkel in 1903, and has 
not heard a case addressing the standards for the issuance of provisional warrants in 
nearly as long"). See also, Nathaniel Persily, International Extradition and the Right to 
Bail, 34 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 407, 436-438 (1998) (questioning the viability of the Court's 
decision in Wright v. Henkel and calling for the reformation of the "special circum-
stances test"); Jeffrey Olson, Gauging an Adequate Probable Cause Standard for Provi-
sional Arrest in Light of Parretti v. United States, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 161 (1998) (as-
serting that should a similar case arise, Congress may eventually have to act by re-
drafting the statute that sets forth the procedure for extradition requests pursuant to 
treaties, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, and that the U.S. may have to renegotiate its extradition 
treaties). 
48. See supra note 43. 
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purpose. 49 Not only does the en bane court's invocation of the 
doctrine appear to have been applied inappropriately under the 
facts of this case, it would appear to be disfavored under Degen 
v. United States, 50 as well.51 
Nedia L. DeSouza * 
49. See supra note 5. The doctrine is viewed as a sanction against fugitives who 
call upon the court's resources. Therefore, dismissing an appeal when someone other 
than the fugitive seeks relief from the court fails to serve the doctrine's purpose. 
50. 517 U.S. 820 (1996) (emphasizing that rules such as the fugitive disentitle-
ment doctrine that foreclose consideration of claims oJ:t the merits should be used cau-
tiously so as not to erode judicial integrity). 
51. See supra note 42. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1999. 
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